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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
stock, especially in view of Rem. Comp. Stat., § 3805, as amended 1925
Sess. L. Ch. 87, P C., §4505.40
Washington, contrary to the weight of authority, has adopted the
rule that when the board of directors of a corporation pay for property
bought with shares of stock, the legality of such act can be attacked
by the creditors if the true value of the property was less than the value
of the stock.41  The majority rule upholds the legality of the act,
if the directors acted in good faith and the subscriber was bona fide.
Under the Washington no-par stock statute, since it makes no difference
to the creditor whether the property paid for in stock is represented by
100 or 1,000 shares, the creditor could not attack the legality of the act
although the existing shareholders might. The recent case of Connor
v. Robinson4 2 lends color to the view that the "true value" theory is
doomed, and that the "good faith" theory will be adopted.
Although there are no decisions on this question, the writer ventures
the opinion as to the effect of this innovation upon the corporation law
of this state, that: 1. The "trust fund" theory will stand in cases where
there is a definite subscription for a definite sum-there remaining a
balance unpaid on the subscription. 2. The "true value" rule will
give way to the "good faith" rule, and where property is transferred
for no-par value shares, relief will be granted creditors only in cases of
actual fraud on the part of the directors in evaluating the property
Jeffrey Heiman.
JURISDICTION OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE-The judgment of a court
ot record and of general jurisdiction, acting within the scope of its
jurisdiction, is presumed to be valid in all particulars unless the con-
trary affirmatively appears on the face of the record.' But even such
a judgment is subject to attack on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.2
The judgment of a court of limited jurisdiction and not of record
enjoys no such presumption, and the jurisdiction of such a court must
be affirmatively shown.' In this state, a justice court is not, and can-
not be made, a court of record, 4 and its jurisdiction is limited both as
to subject matter5 and as to territory 6 Yet in a recent case' the
Supreme Court upheld, against a direct attack, the validity of a default
" "After the 'initial no-par capital' shall have been paid up, the liability
of a subscriber to no-par value stock shall be such as shall be, or shall have
been mutually agreed upon between the corporation and the subscriber of the
stock."
"Lantz v. Moeller 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac. 687 (1913).
"Connor v. Robinson, note 33, supra.
'Ritchte v. Carpenter 2 Wash. 512, 28 Pac. 380 (1891).2Kline Bros. k Co. v. North Coast Fire Ins. Co., 80 Wash 609, 142 Pac. 7
(1914).
'Grzgnon v. Astor 2 How. (U. S.) 319, 11 L. ed. 283 (1844).
4 Const. Art. IV, § 11.
Const., Art. IV, § 10; Rem. Comp. St., §§44-45; P C., §§ 9564-65.
6 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 47 P C., § 9458; further restricted as to civil cases
by Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 1756-7, P C. §§ 9559-60.
'Nichols v. National Association of Creditors, Inc., 137 Wash. 74, 241 Pac.
960 (1925).
NOTE8 AND COMMENT
judgment in a justice court against a defendant residing and served
outside its territorial jurisdiction.
The action was commenced in the Precinct of Ruston, Pierce County,
against a defendant living in Tacoma and service was made in Tacoma.
After default judgment against him, the defendant started suit in the
Superior Court and obtained an injunction restraining the enforce-
ment of the judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace. The Supreme Court held that the justice obtained
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant by service in Tacoma under
the statute" authorizing the justice to issue process to any place in his
county, and directed the Superior Court to sustain the demurrer to the
complaint.
The one point in the case was: can a justice of the peace in a rural
precinct obtain jurisdiction over a defendant residing in a city of more
than three thousand inhabitants contrary to the provision of the Code?9
After citing several other sections and discussing other matters, the
Court said, "We think it cannot be successfully argued that, where an
action is brought in the justice court against a defendant who resides
in a city of more than three thousand inhabitants, in an adjacent
precinct, that no jurisdiction can be acquired," thus deciding the real
point in issue without giving a reason or citing an authority
The section upon which the Supreme Court held the justice of the
peace had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, has come down un-
changed from the territorial days when a justice had civil as well as
criminal jurisdiction throughout the whole county and, m discussing
this point, the Supreme Court ignored the change made in 190110
when jurisdiction of defendants residing in a city of more than 3,000
inhabitants was restricted to the justices of that precinct. The Court
did mention this later section in the paragraph considering the question
of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, but as the suit was
for a debt of less than $100.00, the subject matter was dearly within
the justice's jurisdiction.
The Court distinguished the cases"1 denying to the Superior Court,
a court of record and of general and unlimited jurisdiction, 12 any
jurisdiction of suits against corporations, brought in the wrong county,
upon the ground that in each of them the action was against a corpora-
tion and not an individual, and that under the particular statute 3 the
court did not acquire jurisdiction for any purpose. And yet the
Constitution" provides that the process of the superior courts "shall
'Rem. Comp. Stat, § 48; P C., § 9561.
Rem. Comp. Stat, §§ 1756-1, P. C., §§ 9559-60.
10 See note 9, supra.
"McMaster v. Advance Thresher Co., 10 Wash. 147, 38 Pac. 760 (1894),
State ex rol. Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. Superior Court, 118 Wash. 674,
204 Pac. 783 (1922).
"1 Const., Art IV, § 6.
"Rem. Comp. Stat., § 206; P C., § 8543.
2" See note 11, supra.
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extend to all parts of the state", which is as inclusive a grant as that
to the justice of the peace 5 upon which the Court relied.
The Court cites the section'6 allowing change of venue in justice
court for the same causes as in the superior court" as authority for its
decision, reasoning that since this allows a change of venue from a city
justice to a rural justice, the latter must be held to have original juris-
diction. The second, third and fourth subdivisions of this latter sec
tion'8 would authorize a change of venue of a suit against a corpora-
tion to a county in which it had no office and thus the reasoning of
the principal case, if strictly followed to its logical conclusion, would
justify jurisdiction in the Superior Court of King County in a suit
against a corporation which had its principal place of business in
Tacoma and had never done any business outside of Pierce County, a
result contrary to the decisions construing Rem. Comp. Stat., § 206,
P C., § 8543.
The wording of the statute fixing venue in the superior court varies
slightly in the different sections'" which are followed by Rem. Comp.
Stat., § 208, P C., § 8543, providing that an action, started in the
wrong county, may be tried there unless the defendant moves for a
change to the proper county Although the section as to venue of suits
against corporations reads "may" and the sections as to individuals
rcad "shall" or "must," the Supreme Court has held that the superior
court gets no jurisdiction whatever in a suit against a corporation com-
menced in the wrong county20 even though other defendants are resi-
dents of the county2 '1 and does not even have jurisdiction to transfer
the case to the proper county upon the defendant corporation's own
motion. 2   The latest amendment of the section 2 governing suits against
corporations, enacted in 1909, is entitled "An Act relating to the venue
of civil actions ",24 and the word "jurisdiction" does not appear
either in the body of the Act or in its title. Yet the Supreme Court has
recently stated that "Were § 206 purely a venue statute it might be
possible But this court has consistently and persistently since
first considering § 206, adhered to the interpretation that that section
was one relating to jurisdiction and not to venue." 2 5
The wording of the statute is that "All civil actions against a
defendant residing in a city or town of more than three thousand
inhabitants shall be brought in the justice court of the precinct
"See Note 12, supra.
"Rem. Comp. Stat., § 1775; P C., § 9650.
11 Rem. Comp. Stat., § 209. P C., § 8545.
"S ee note 17, supra.
" Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 204-7 P C., §§ 8541-44.
' McMaster v. Advance Thresher Co., note 11, supra.
I State ex rel. Seattle Nat. Bank v. Joiner 88 Wash. Dec. 201, 244 Pac. 551
(1926).
'State ex rel. Grays Harbor Commercial Co. v. Superior Court, note 11,
,,upra.
'Rem. Comp. Stat., § 206; P C., § 8543.
'Laws 1909, Ch. 42, p. 69.
' State ex rel. Seattle National Bank v. Joiner note 21, supra.
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in which one or more of such defendants reside.26 The jurisdiction of
justices of the peace, in all civil actions, except as provided in the pre-
ceding section, shall be coextensive with the limits ok the county
seems a much stronger limitation of jurisdiction than "An action
against a corporation may be brought "27 But the Supreme
Court did not so interpret it.
It is submitted that an affirmance of the decision of the Superior
Court, that a rural justice of the peace has no jurisdiction over an
inhabitant of a city of more than three thousand inhabitants, would
have been more in accord with the intent of the Legislature.
H. C. Force.
CONTRACTS NOT To BE PERFORMED WITHIN A YEAR UNDER
STATUTE OF FRAuDs IN WASHINGTON-The statute of frauds in
Washington,1 states that in certain specified cases an agreement, con-
tract and promise shall be void unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith. By subdivision I this provision extends to every
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed in one year from
the making thereof. Two recent decisions of our Supreme Court have
gone into an extended interpretation of this subdivision regarding two
troublesome questions of law arising thereunder.
The first of these questions is: What is the test for determining
whether the oral agreement by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof?
In the case of Tonkoff v. Roche Fruit & Produce Co.,2 a contract
was entered into on November 28, 1922, by the terms of which
appellant was to dispose of respondent's 1923 crop of apples for the
agreed compensation of fifteen cents per box. The respondent con-
tended that the contract was void for the reason that it was not to be
performed within one year from the making thereof. The case was
reversed, and the Court answered respondent's contention by stating-
"The contract was made on November 28, 1922, and fixes no time
for its performance, and the court cannot say that all its terms could
not have been complied with prior to November 28, 1923. It is quite
possible that the performance could be entirely made within that time,
and it is of no consequence that the appellant and the respondent may
have been of the opinion that the contract might extend beyond the
year, or that, as a matter of fact, it did so extend.
"The true test is not what the parties expected or what actually hap-
pened, but whether the contract by its terms must endure longer than
the year."
Rem. Comp. Stat., §§ 1756-7, P C., §§ 9559-60.
=Rem. Comp. Stat, § 206; P C., § 8543.Rem. Comp. Stat., § 5825; P C., § 7745.
2137 Wash. 148, .42 Pac. 3 (1926).
